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LAWYER-THE PUBLIC SERVANT

In times of strained and distressed financial circumstances
the lawyer can best perform his duty as a public servant.
Whether the client be rich or poor the lawyer fully cognizant
of his responsibility to the community accepts the cases of
clients and conscientiously labors upon their behalf. He accepts the call of public office, often at great personal sacrifice,
to become the standard bearer of his party. He devotes himself to communal, charitable and social reform movements for
the benefit of all. By training and experience the lawyer is
well fitted to serve the people. Ours is an honorable profession to be honorably carried on by the members of the bar.
TRIAL BY JURY

A recent report by a committee of the New York Bar
Association discloses some interesting facts. It was noted that
in some States a unanimous verdict of a jury is not required.
In Indiana a jury facing disagreement may be called into
Court and advised that a verdict of not less than 10 will be
received. In Minnesota, in civil actions, a verdict by 10 will
be received after 12 hours of deliberation. In Nebraska, a
verdict of 10 may be received after 6 hours of deliberation.
In Wisconsin the verdict may be by 10. In Kentucky verdicts of less than 12 are acceptable. In Arizona, California,
Idaho, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, South Dakota,
and Washington a verdict of nine jurors in civil cases is valid.
UNANIMITY RULE

The advisability of recommending a change in the rule
relating to unanimous verdicts by juries was fully considered
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by the New York Bar Committee. The principal contentions urged against it were that a decision by a lesser number
than the whole jury would tend to a compromise of verdicts
in civil cases and does not properly safeguard the rights of
an accused.
The conclusion of the committee, however, was in favor
of continuing the present practice of a verdict by a unanimous
jury, and that any change from the present system was inadvisable.
PUBLIC DEFENDERS

A survey by the Carnegie Foundation entitled "Justice
and the Poor" emphasizes the failure of the present system
of assigning counsel to defend a criminal lacking means to
retain his own counsel. The following statement is pertinent
here:
"The assignment of counsel in criminal cases, except
where the offense charged is murder, has been a general
failure. In part it becomes a means of extortion. As a system
both in plan and operation it deserves unqualified condemnation."
Cities using a public defender have reported that such an
office has resulted in economy and proper representation of the
accused. California, Nebraska, and Connecticut, are among
the States in accord with a public defender plan. Colorado
would do well to institute such an office.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO DICTA

As previously stated in these columns Dicta depends upon
members of the Bar for its material. The preparation and
submission of articles for publication herein will greatly enhance its value. The members of the association are urged
to take advantage of this privilege.

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
By Edward D. Upham, Chairman for the Committee
The Committee on Professional Ethics reports the following statements of questions submitted to it with regard to
professional conduct and its opinions thereon:
STATEMENT
A.
An attorney, A. B., is licensed as a private detective, and, in connection
with his law office, owns and conducts a private detective and collection agency
under the name of "A. B. Investigation Service," advertising and sending out
solicitors, to solicit collections and investigations in the name of "A. B.
Investigation Service." Many of the persons so solicited have matters requiring the service of an attorney, either in the courts, or in office matters, and
the attorney, through the contacts so made, secures employment in such
matters from the persons so solicited.
QUESTION
Does the above stated arrangement and manner of doing business violate
professional ethics?
OPINION
In the opinion of the Committee, yes.
As this Committee regards the statement the "Service," if not actually
organized to drum up legal business for the attorney, is operated to do so.
The rule against solicitation is violated.
In American Bar Association Journal for May, 1932, page 340, the
Association Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, passing upon
a question of like nature, in language appropriately covering the situation,
says,
"It is not necessarily improper for an attorney to engage in a business;
but impropriety arises when the business is of such a nature or is conducted
in such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyer's duties as a member
of the bar. Such an inconsistency arises when the business is one that will
readily lend itself as a means for procuring professional employment for him,
is such that it can be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on his behalf, or
is of a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice
of law. To avoid such inconsistencies it is always desirable and usually
necessary that the lawyer keep any business in which he is engaged entirely
separate and-apart from his practice of law and he must, in any event, conduct
it with due observance of the standards of conduct required of him as a
lawyer."

STATEMENT
B.
An attorney, being indebted to a mercantile company upon a note,
secured by a chattel mortgage upon personal property, is unable to pay the
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note. The mercantile company insists upon payment and threatens foreclosure, and then sends the lawyer to an affiliated loan company stating that
the loan company will loan him sufficient money to pay the debt. The attorney thereupon applies to the loan company for, and obtains a loan of less
than $300, repayable in monthly installments, secured by a note and chattel
mortgage to the loan company upon the same personal property, with the
proceeds of which loan he discharges his debt to the mercantile company.
The loan company, however, charges the attorney an illegal rate of
interest on the loan, but the attorney, at the time of obtaining the loan, did
not question the rate of interest. He says he was unable to obtain the money
elsewhere and was compelled to accept the loan at that rate of interest or lose
the property on the mortgage to the mercantile company. By reason of the
high rate of interest charged by the loan company, its note and chattel
mortgage are void under the provisions of Chapter 63, C. L. 1921
The attorney is unable to repay the first installment of the loan to the
loan company, and applies to the loan company for a short extension of time,
which is refused. The loan company then tries to take possession of the
property under the void chattel mortgage. The attorney refuses to surrender
the property and thereafter advises the loan company that, inasmuch as it
refused him a short extension of time, and tried to take possession of the
property, he will rely on the provisions of the "loan shark" law to defeat
the mortgage.
Thereupon the loan company refers the matter to its attorney, and its
attorney, on behalf of the loan company, then offers to credit on the note the
amount of the usurious overcharge, thus purging the loan of its usurious
features. The borrower, however, says that, being in straitened financial
circumstances, and being afraid that, in view of the controversy that has
arisen, the loan company will take advantage of its first opportunity to declare
a technical default and declare the whole note due, if it is purged of the
usury, refuses to make any new agreement which will have the effect of
purging the usury. He advises the loan company's attorney, however, that
he recognizes a moral obligation to, and will, repay the amount actually borrowed, as soon as he is able to do so, but in view of the attitude which the
loan company has exhibited, is afraid to, and unwilling to. convert the moral
obligation into a legal obligation. The loan company's attorney takes the
position that it is the borrower's duty, as an attorney, to convert the moral
obligation into a legal obligation, by giving a new note from which the usurious overcharge -is excluded. The borrowing attorney says he intends to discharge his moral obligation by repaying the loan company the amount actually
borrowed, as soon as he is able to do so, but that, in the meantime, the obligation will have to remain a moral obligation, and he will not give a new note.
QUESTIONS
1. Under the above state of facts, is it the duty of the borrowing
attorney to convert the moral obligation, which he acknowledges as such, into
a legal obligation, waiving the protection of the "loan shark" law, and giving
a new note for the amount borrowed, or may he simply let the matter rest in
statu quo, as he proposes to do, until he is able to, and does, repay the loan?
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2. If the borrowing attorney converts his moral obligation into a legal
obligation by giving a new note for the amount borrowed, is it his duty to
give security for the new note?
3. Under the above state of facts, is the attorney for the loan company, who is informed of all the facts, justified in advising the loan company
to bring suit on the void note, knowing that it is void, but believing that the
borrowing attorney will execute a new note to avoid the embarrassment of
being sued?
OPINION
1, 2. In the opinion of the Committee the borrower attorney is not
from the standpoint of professional ethics under any obligation to prejudice
himself by surrendering in whole or in part a control of the situation arising
from the unlawful act of the loan company; but he will remain in honor
bound to pay the debt.
3. It is the opinion of the Committee that an attempt to coerce by
threatening suit on an admittedly unenforceable claim partakes of the nature
of blackmail and is reprehensible. See Canon 30.

L

AW presupposes ideas, however rudimentary, of justice. But, law being
once established, just, in matters of the law, denotes whatever is done
in express fulfillment of the rules of law, or is approved and allowed by law.
Not everything which is not forbidden is just. Many things are left alone
by the state, as it were under protest, and only because it is thought that
interference would do more harm than good. In such things the notion of
justice has no place * * * The words "just" and "justice," and corresponding words in other tongues, have never quite lost ethical significance even in
the most technical legal context.

The only road to advancement is to do your work so well that you are
always ahead of the demands of your position. Our employers do not decide
whether we shall stay where we are or go on and up; we decide that matter
ourselves. Success or failure are not chosen for us; we choose them for ourselves.-Hamilton Wright Mabie.
True contentment depends not on what we have. A tub was large
enough for Diogenes; but a world too little for Alexander.-Charles Caleb
Colton.
The successful man takes plenty of time for thought. He carefully
looks the ground over, searches for weak and strong points, then adjusts himself to the needed conditions.-Dresser.

MUST COLORADO REAL PROPERTY
INSTALLMENT SALE CONTRACTS BE
FORECLOSED AS MORTGAGES?
Percy S. Morris of the Denver Bar
T has long been the practice in Colorado that, whenever
real estate was being sold with a cash payment constituting
only a small part of the purchase price, a contract of sale
would be made, such contract providing for the payment of
the purchase price in specified installments and that upon payment of the purchase price in full the title to the property would
be conveyed by the seller to the purchaser and that in event of
failure on the part of the purchaser to make any of the payments of principal or interest provided by the contract or in
event of any other violation of the terms of the contract on the
part of the purchaser then, upon the default continuing for a
specified period after notice from the seller to the purchaser
(time being of the essence of the contract), the contract might
be terminated by the seller and in such event all payments
theretofore made thereunder should be retained by the seller
as liquidated damages and the seller should have the right to
re-enter and take possession of the property.
During all of this time until the rendering of the decisions
in the cases of Pope vs. Parker and Fairview Mining Corporation vs. American Mines and Smelting Company, which will
be hereinafter discussed, it was generally understood in Colorado that, 'if the period of notice specified in the contract was
reasonable, the method of termination of the rights of the purchaser in the manner provided by the contract was a valid and
legal one and that, upon the purchaser being in default, the
specified notice being given and the default continuing during
the specified period, the contract and all rights of the purchaser in and to the property and to possession thereof were
terminated.
In accordance with this generally accepted view, it was
taken for granted by the attorneys and by the Courts that, in
the event of such a termination of the contract of sale, if the
purchaser continued in the possession of the property thereafter, the remedy of the seller would be an action to recover
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possession of the property, such as an unlawful detainer suit
or an action in ejectment, and that the judgment of the Court
in such a possessory action in favor of the seller constituted
an adjudication that the contract of sale had been legally
terminated and the purchaser therefore had no further right
either to the possession of the property or in the title to the
property. And, if the purchaser voluntarily surrendered possession after the termination of the contract but his contract
appeared of record so that it constituted a cloud on the title
and a quit claim deed could not be secured from him, it was
considered that a decree in a suit against him to quiet title or
to remove a cloud would definitely clear the record title from
such contract.
That this practice and this general understanding was
justified by the state of the law as it then stood in Colorado
is shown by the following statute and decisions:
Section 6369 of the 1921 Compiled Laws, which is a part
of the chapter on unlawful detention, a purely possessory
action, provides:
"Any person shall be deemed and held guilty of an unlawful detention
of real property in the following cases: * * *
"Ninth-When a vendee, having obtained possession under an agreement to purchase lands, or tenements, and having failed to comply with his
agreement, withholds possession thereof from his vendor, or assigns, after
demand therefor being duly made."

The foregoing statute has been in force since 1885. Under the express provisions of Sec. 281 of our Code a mortgagee
cannot recover possession of real property without foreclosure
and sale and therefore this statute was a clear expression of the
understanding on the part of the Legislature that the relation
of seller and purchaser under such a contract did not involve
the relation of mortgagee and mortgagor.
Hundreds of cases have been brought in the courts of
Colorado by sellers against purchasers under defaulted contracts of sale to recover possession of real estate or to quiet
title or remove cloud and where the court found that the contract had been terminated in accordance with its terms it
would in each case grant the relief prayed for. That this
view was also shared by our Supreme Court is shown by the
following cases:
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In Roller vs. Smith, 76 Colo. 371, suit was brought in
ejectment by a vendor to recover possession of the real estate
upon the forfeiture by the vendee under the terms of a contract of sale. The Supreme Court held that ejectment was
the proper remedy, the Court saying:
"The elimination of the equitable relief was right. The contract provided that upon failure to pay instalments the vendee's rights and his possession should be forfeited. It was on the ground of failure to pay instalments
that the suit was brought. This was to enforce, not to cancel the contract.
There was no function for equity to perform. The complaint should have
been ejectment, drawn under Code of 1921, sec. 287."

In Scroggs vs. Harkness Heights Land Company, 76
Colo. 597, suit was brought to quiet title as against a recorded
contract of purchase after default and the notice given of
termination in accordance with its terms. Upon trial judgment was rendered for the plaintiff and this judgment was
affirmed by the Supreme Court. The question of whether
action to quiet title was the proper remedy was not raised in
the case or decided by either Court.
Somewhat the same is true of the case of Ruth vs. Smith,
29 Colo. 154 in which suit was brought by the vendor in unlawful detainer under the ninth subdivision above quoted. In
that case the court assumed that unlawful detainer was the
proper suit where a vendee had entered into possession of the
premises in pursuance of a contract of sale and had made
default.
In Mesa Market Company vs. Crosby, 174 Fed. 96, which
was a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Eighth
Circuit upon an appeal from the District Court of the District
of Colorado, the contract for sale of real estate provided that
in case of default on the part of the purchaser the vendor
should be entitled to resume possession and terminate the right
of purchase and in such case all installments of purchase price
paid and all improvements added to the premises were to be
regarded as rental of the premises during the occupancy of
the purchaser; and the Court held that upon the happening
of default in performance by the purchaser the relation between the parties became that of landlord and tenant because
of the said provisions of the contract.
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The precise question was first squarely decided by our
Supreme Court in the case of Schiffner vs. Chicago Title and
Trust Company, 79 Colo. 249. This was an action of detention to recover possession of the property; defendant was in
possession of the property as the result of having entered into
a contract with plaintiff for the purchase of same by defendant
and had failed to comply with such contract. The Court
after discussing the statute already quoted, said:
"It is next argued that the contract must be treated as an equitable
mortgage, but there can be no mortgage of any kind unless the mortgagor
has some real estate to pledge. This the defendant did not have. Whatever
rights, either legal or equitable, he had in the land did not affect the contract
in question in its character as an agreement to purchase. Being such an
agreement, the plaintiff had the right to proceed under the unlawful detainer
act above quoted."

However, in the case of Pope vs. Parker, 84 Colo. 535,
a different rule was apparently announced by our Supreme
Court. In that case the contract of sale provided that if the
purchaser defaulted the seller should "have the right to enter
upon the above described premises and sell the same at public
sale" to pay the purchase price, accounting to the purchaser
for any surplus. The seller brought a suit to quiet title, claiming a termination of the contract because of default, and in
its opinion the Supreme Court said that it was clear enough
that such contract was a mortgage which secured to the seller
the performance of the obligations of the purchaser to him
and that the fact that the seller retained the title to the property as security was the same in effect as if the purchaser had
conveyed it to him for that purpose. The Court then said:
"Plaintiff's action, therefore, should have been to foreclose his mortgage instead of to quiet his title, but since the proper facts were set up to
justify a decree of foreclosure the action should have been treated as such
and a foreclosure sale ordered."

In this case the contract did not contain any forfeiture
clause and did not provide that time should be of the essence
and in addition the language in the contract in such case was
most peculiar and expressly provided that in the event of
default the vendor should have the right to enter upon the
premises and sell the same at public sale to pay the purchase
price and this naturally would lead to the inference that, since
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the parties themselves had agreed that the rights of the purchaser should be terminated by a public sale, this necessarily
involved a foreclosure and necessarily implied that the transaction constituted a mortgage which could be foreclosed only
by an action brought for that purpose. For these reasons, the
decision in Pope vs. Parker merely raised in the minds of
attorneys the question of whether the language of the Court
in that case was applicable to the ordinary case of an installment contract containing the usual provision for termination
mentioned at the beginning of this discussion.
However, more specific statements along the same line
were soon afterwards made by our Supreme Court in the case
of Fairview Mining Corporation vs. American Mines and
Smelting Company, 86 Colo. 77. The facts in that case were
different from those of the ordinary sale of real estate on an
installment contract and the circumstances in that case were
rather unusual. However, the language of the Supreme Court
in deciding the case appeared to establish a new general rule
different from that which, as already stated, had previously
been generally accepted as applicable to all installment sale
contracts of real estate.
In the Fairview case an option was given for the sale of
mining property which option the Court held became later a
contract for sale and purchase binding on both parties; the
purchaser made default in the making of payments and refused to vacate the property and the vendor brought an action
to recover possession. It is true that on page 83 the Court
said that there was no specific provision in the contract as to
forfeiture for non-payment and time was not thereby made the
essence of the contract, but the language which later in the
opinion the Court used appeared to be applicable to any case
of a contract for the sale of real estate on time payments. Such
language was the following:
"The grantors in this contract retained title to the property doubtless
as security for the payment of the agreed purchase price. If so, the relation
between them and the granteq is the same as if title had passed from the grantor to the grantee and the latter had conveyed the title back to the grantor as
security for such payment. Pope v. Parker, 84 Colo. 535, 271 Pac. 1118.
Moreover, the language of the contract wherein the provision is that royalties
paid under the provisions of paragraph 11, should be considered as rent and
belong to the plaintiffs or lessors and not as a penalty or forfeiture, but as
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liquidated damages, and other provisions of similar import indicate that the
grantors and lessors were not intending to insist upon the penalty of a forfeiture. * 0 *

"Such being the law applicable to this case, and since with us separation
of causes into law and equity no longer exists, plaintiff was wrong, under the
admitted facts in the second defense of the answer, in resorting to an action
for the recovery of possession. Plaintiff should have employed the equitable
remedy of foreclosure and sale to the case as made by the admitted allegations
of the answer, which is the same as, or similar to, that of grantor and grantee
where the grantor retains the legal title of the property, which is the subject
matter of sale, in the nature of security for payment of the puTichase price or
the balance of the purchase price due. In substance, the transaction stated in
this defense is that of an owner of land who is selling it on time or credit,
and instead of conveying the legal title of the property to the grantee, retains
the same as security for payment of the purchase price. It is similar also to

a transaction between a creditor and debtor where the debtor has by warranty
deed conveyed land to his creditor to secure the payment of the debt, which
transaction courts generally treat as, in substance, a mortgage, in which case,
and in the case now before us, the proper and only remedy or procedure is by
foreclosure and sale, since section 281 of our Code of Civil Procedure expressly declares that a mortgage of real property shall not be deemed a conveyance whatever its terms, so as to enable the owner of a mortgage to recover
possession of the real property without foreclosure and sale. This was explicitly ruled in our recent case of Pope vs. Parker, supra. The transaction
there was like the one now under review. The parties entered into a contract
for the sale of land, the grantor retaining title to the land. The consideration was to be paid in installments and if the purchaser defaulted the grantor
or vendor was given the right to enter the premises and sell them at public
sale to pay the purchase price. We held that this was a mortgage in legal
effect and that the provisions in the contract reserving the right in the vendor
to enter the premises and sell them at public sale, was void and that the vendor's or grantor's remedy on purchaser's default, and the only remedy, was
by action to foreclose and sell."

And the Court then directed that the judgment for the
plaintiff be reversed with directions to the District Court to
set aside and vacate such judgment and give plaintiff a reasonable time within which to file a new complaint, in the nature
of a suit for foreclosure and sale of the mining property for
the balance due on the purchase price.
In neither the Pope vs. Parker case nor the Fairview case
did the Supreme Court refer in any way to the section of the
unlawful detainer statute, which has been quoted herein, or
to the decision in Schiffner vs. Chicago Title and Trust Company in 79 Colo. from which has been quoted herein the ruling
that the contract of sale was not an equitable mortgage.
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After the decision in the Fairview case had been rendered
most, if not all, of the lawyers, who carefully studied such
opinion, felt that any installment contract for the sale of real
estate would have to be considered by them as being in effect
the conveyance of the title to the purchaser and the giving
back by the purchaser of a mortgage for the balance of the
purchase price and the interests and rights of the purchaser
thereunder could not be involuntarily terminated or cut out
without a foreclosure action, decree, sale thereunder and expiration of the statutory period of redemption. This opinion
of the attorneys was based not so much upon the facts in the
Fairview case as upon the language herein quoted, which the
Supreme Court used in arriving at its decision therein.
However, recently a new decision was rendered by our
Supreme Court which makes a radical change in this situation.
Such decision is American Mortgage Company vs. Logan, 90
Colo. 157.
In the Logan case the Logans brought suit to quiet title
as against a contract which they had given to the Mortgage
Company for the sale of land owned by them at the price of
$28,000.00 of which $8,000.00 had been paid in stock of the
Mortgage Company at the time of execution of the contract,
the contract providing for $18,000.00 in cash to be paid four
and a half months later, the balance of $2,000.00 to be evidenced by a note of the Mortgage Company to be given on
delivery of deed; as expressly stated in the opinion, time was
made of the essence of the contract and it was provided that
in case of failure of the Mortgage Company to pay any installment within the prescribed time, the contract might be
forfeited and determined at the election of the Logans upon
giving a thirty-day notice of such election and that in that
event all payments already made should be retained by the
Logans as liquidated damages; such contract did not give the
right of possession to the Mortgage Company prior to delivery of the deed and the Logans continued in possession; time
of payment of the $18,000.00 was twice extended but no part
of same was paid by the Mortgage Company and the only
cash payment made by the Mortgage Company was $540.00
on account of interest; after the expiration of the last extension the Logans gave a thirty-day notice of their election to
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declare the contract forfeited and terminated because of failure to make the required payment and, after expiration of
the thirty days, they commenced suit. The Court held that
the transaction did not constitute a mortgage and that foreclosure suit was not necessary to terminate the rights of the
Mortgage Company, but that a quiet title suit would lie; the
Court also held that under the facts and equities of the case
the Mortgage Company was not entitled to any relief from
a forfeiture. The Court said in part:
"The contention of the Mortgage Company is that the transaction
created between the Mortgage Company and the Logans the relation of mortgagor and mortgagees, and therefore, that in order to foreclose the company's
rights there must be a judicial foreclosure as in case of mortgages, with the
accompanying statutory right of redemption. With that contention we do
not agree.
"The contract is one customarily used where real property is sold on
installments, with the exception that ordinarily there is a provision for immediate possession of the property by the vendee. Section 6369, Compiled
Laws, provides that where a vendee, who has entered into possession under
an agreement to purchase, fails to comply with the agreement and withholds
possession from the vendor, after demand therefor, he is guilty of unlawful
detainer. In such case the vendor may recover possession in an action brought
under the unlawful detainer act. Section 281, Code of Civil Procedure, provides: 'A mortgage of real property shall not be deemed a conveyance, whatever its terms, so as to enable the owner of the mortgage to recover possession
of the real property without foreclosure and sale.' These two provisions clearly indicate that, in the view of the legislature, such a contract as the one involved in this suit is not a mortgage and is not to be treated as such; for if it
were, either actually or in effect, a mortgage, the vendor could not recover
possession under the unlawful detainer act until after foreclosure and sale,
and then only in the event that he purchased at the sale.
"That unlawful detainer will lie where a vendee, in possession under
a contract to purchase, withholds possession from the vendor after default and
demand, see Schiffner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 79 Colo. 249, 244 Pac.
1012. Such was the procedure in Ruth v. Smith, 29 Colo. 154, 68 Pac. 278.
Or, in such case, the vendor may sue in ejectment under sections 285 and 287
of the Code of Civil Procedure. Roller v. Smith, 76 Colo. 371, 231 Pac. 656.
If the vendor is in possession, he may sue to quiet title under section 275 of
the Code. Scroggs v. Harkness Heights Land Co., 76 Colo. 597, 233 Pac.
831. In the Schiffner case we-said: 'It is next argued that the contract must
be treated as an equitable mortgage, but there can be no mortgage of any kind
unless the mortgagor has some real estate to pledge. This the defendant did
not have. Whatever rights, either legal or equitable, he had in the land did not
affect the contract in question in its character as an agreement to purchase.
Being such an agreement, the plaintiff had the right to proceed under the
unlawful detainer act.' And in the Roller case the law is stated thus: 'The
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elimination of the equitable relief was right. The contract provided that upon
failure to pay instalments the vendee's rights and his possession should be forfeited. It was on the ground of failure to pay instalments that the suit was
brought. This was to enforce, not to cancel the contract. There was no
function for equity to perform. The complaint should have been ejectment,
drawn under Code of 1921, sec. 287.' Although the case of Gordon Tiger
Mining Co. v. Brown, 56 Colo. 301, 138 Pac. 51, concerned an option, and
the decision, therefore, does not control the present case, the opinion contains
the following language that is applicable here: 'When by a contract for the
sale of real property the vesting of title is made to depend upon conditions
precedent, with the provision that a failure to comply with such conditions
shall operate as a forfeiture of the rights of the vendee, then his failure to
perform such conditions operates as a forfeiture of his rights. 1 Pomeroy's
Equity Jurisprudence, section 455. In determining the question under consideration the distinction between conditions precedent and subsequent in contracts for the sale of real estate must be borne in mind.' In the contract now
before us, as we have seen, the payment of the purchase price is expressly made
a condition precedent to the vesting of title. * *
"But the Mortgage Company contends that all this has been changed
by our decisions in Pope v. Parker, 84 Colo. 535, 271 Pac. 1118, and Fairview
Mining Corporation v. American Mines & Smelting Co., 86 Colo. 77, 278
Pac. 800. That is a mistake. We had no intention of overruling, nor did
we overrule, the cases previously decided by us and cited above, nor did we
intend to modify the law as announced therein. The contracts in the Pope
and the Fairview cases were radically different from She one now before the
court, and we held that, in effect, they were mortgages."

The Court then distinguishes the contracts in the Pope
and Fairview cases from the one in the case then before it in
the following language:
"In the Pope case, supra, the contract provided for possession by the
vendee and that in case of default in the payment of any installment the vendor should have the right to enter and sell the property at public sale to pay
the unpaid installment of the purchase price, accounting to the vendee for any
surplus. Time was not made of the essence of the contract, and there was no
forfeiture clause. That such contract was, in effect, a mortgage is clear. We
held that under our Code of Civil Procedure, the provision for entry and sale
was void; that foreclosure could be had only in the manner provided in chapter 21 of that Code. The contract now before us is entirely different. That
case, therefore, has no application to the present one. Mr. Justice Denison,
who wrote the opinion also wrote the opinions in Roller v. Smith, supra, and
Scroggs v. Harkness Heights Land Co., supra. The contracts in those cases
and in Schiffner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., supra, and Ruth v. Smith,
supra, were so obviously different from the contract in the Pope case that it
was considered unnecessary to refer to the former cases, even for the purpose
of distinguishing them.
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"The contract in the Fairview case, also, differed in important particulars from that under consideration here and from the contracts before the
court in the Roller, Scroggs, Schiffner and Ruth cases, supra. As stated in
the opinion, time was not made of the essence of the contract; there was no
specific provision for forfeiture, the contract, on the contrary, indicating by
its terms that the parties 'were not intending to insist upon the penalty of a
forfeiture'; and the title was retained as security for the payment of the purchase price. It was also stated in the opinion that the transaction in Pope v.
Parker, supra, 'was like the one *** under review' in the Fairview case. The
contract, therefore, was, in effect, a mortgage. It is to be noted, also, that
there were strong equities in favor of the vendee in that case. It appears that
the vendee paid more than one-half of the purchase price; that it greatly
enhanced the value of the property by making numerous and expensive improvements; that it intended to make the final payment within the time permitted by the extension agreement and expected to be able to do so; and that
upon the arrival of the due date without payment having been made, the
vendor immediately attempted to terminate the contract and retain all the
benefits received. Mr. Justice Campbell, who wrote the opinion, also wrote
the opinion in Ruth v. Smith, supra, and concurred in the opinion in Schiffner
v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., supa. As the contracts in those cases were
different from the contract in the Fairview case, and as there was no intention
to change the law as stated in the Ruth and the Schiffner cases, it was not
deemed necessary to refer to them in the opinion in the Fairview case."

Having distinguished the contracts in the Pope and Fairview cases from the one in the case before it, the Court then
disposes of the effect of the general language (which, as has
already been stated, appeared to lay down a general rule),
contained in the decision in the Fairview case, by the
following:
"Counsel for the Mortgage Company rely upon certain language in the
opinion in the Fairview case; but in that case, as in all others, the language
used in the opinion must be considered in connection with the facts."

And the Court then cites a number of Colorado and
United States Supreme Court decisions to the effect that general language in a decision must be confined to the facts of
that particular case.

' The Court concludes its discussion of the question of
whether the transaction in question constituted a mortgage by

the following:
"We hold that the contract now before us was not a mortgage, or in
the nature of a mortgage, or in effect a mortgage."

Having disposed of the question of whether the contract
in question was in effect a mortgage which would have to be
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foreclosed to cut out the rights of the purchaser, the Court
then considers whether, under the facts of the case and the
equities of the respective parties, the purchaser was entitled
to relief against a forfeiture and, after laying down the general rule that equity abhors a forfeiture and in a proper case
will relieve against one but that a vendee is not entitled to
relief against a forfeiture where he makes no attempt to fulfill
his part of the contract and his default was not caused by
fraud, ignorance not willful, surprise, accident, or mistake
and, after discussing the facts of the case and the equities of
the parties, holds that the Mortgage Company was not entitled
to any relief from a forfeiture and there affirmed the judgment of the trial court quieting the title of the Logans and
removing the cloud of the contract of sale.
In the discussion by the Court of the question of whether
the Mortgage Company was entitled to relief from a forfeiture
the following language is extremely pertinent to the question
of whether, even if the purchaser were entitled to relief from
a forfeiture, the contract would by reason thereof be considered to be a mortgage requiring foreclosure:
"Even if there were equities entitling the Mortgage Company to such
relief, the court would not decree a foreclosure, as in case of mortgages. The
utmost that the Mortgage Company, in such case, could claim would be a
reasonable time after default in which to perform its agreement and thereby
prevent a forfeiture. But in the present case it had all the delay that equity

would require."

It is to be noted that in discussing the question of relief
from a forfeiture the Court very carefully phrases its language
so as to make it clear that the question of whether the vendee
is entitled to relief from a forfeiture is one entirely independent of the question of whether the contract constitutes a mortgage which must be foreclosed by suit.
From a careful study of the opinion in the Logan case it
would seem that the following are the results of such decision:
an installment contract of sale of real estate does not necessarily create the relation of mortgagor and mortgagee; the general
language in the Pope and Fairview cases, which appeared to
lay down a rule that such relation was necessarily created by
such a contract, is to be confined to cases where the contracts
are similar to those in the Pope and Fairview cases; since the
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contract in the Pope case contained a most unusual provision
expressly requiring, in event of default, a public sale of the
property and the accounting to the purchaser for any surplus,
a case involving a contract containing such a provision would
be extremely rare; furthermore, as was emphasized by the
Court in its decision in the Logan case, "time was not made
of the essence of the contract and there was no forfeiture
clause" in the contract in the Pope case, and, similarly, "time
was not made of the essence of the contract; there was no
specific provision for forfeiture" in the contract in the Fairview case; therefore, if in any case under consideration the
contract expressly provides that time shall be of the essence
of the contract and such contract contains a specific provision
for forfeiture upon a specified notice (the period of such notice being a reasonable one), such a contract would not be
similar to the contract in either the Pope case or the Fairview
case and therefore it would not be governed by either the Pope
case or the Fairview case but would be controlled by the
Logan case with a result that such a contract would not be in
effect a mortgage and no action to foreclose would be required
to terminate the rights of the purchaser thereunder; if, because of improvements made by the purchaser or the proportion of the purchase price already paid, or other equities of
the parties, the purchaser would be entitled to relief, such
relief would not be through the Court decreeing a foreclosure
and a sale thereunder but would be through the allowing by
the Court to the purchaser of further time "in which to perform its agreement and thereby prevent a forfeiture"; these
equities entitling the purchaser to such relief against a forfeiture would have no connection with the question of whether
the transaction constituted a mortgage because, if at the time
the contract was made the contract did not constitute a mortgage, the acts of the parties subsequent thereto with reference
to the amount paid on the purchase price, the improvements
made by the purchaser and other matters discussed in the
Pope and Fairview decisions would not transform it into a
mortgage and, conversely, if it did constitute a mortgage at
the time it was executed, the subsequent acts of the parties in
the way of making payments, improving the property and
other acts referred to in the Pope and Fairview cases would
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not make the contract any the less a mortgage; whether the
transaction constitutes a mortgage depends upon the terms
of the contract and the facts as they existed at the time of its
execution and not upon equities arising from acts subsequent
thereto; and as a logical conclusion from the foregoing, if, in
any case involving an installment contract for sale of real
estate containing the provisions mentioned in the first paragraph hereof, the seller brings a suit against the purchaser,
whether such suit be in ejectment or unlawful detainer or an
action to quiet title or to remove a cloud, and, if jurisdiction
is acquired by proper service of process, a judgment or decree
rendered against the purchaser, whether the same be upon
default or after a hearing on the merits, will be conclusive
that the rights of the purchaser under such contract have been
terminated and that he no longer has any interest in the property under such contract.
If, however, a case involving the question discussed
herein should be in the Federal Court in Colorado the foregoing rules would not be applicable because of the decision
in the case In re Ben Boldt, Jr. Floral Co., 37 Fed. (2d) 499.
This was a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the
Tenth Circuit upon appeal from the District Court for the
District of Colorado and the contract involved therein was in
the ordinary form of installment contract in use in Colorado
providing time should be of the essence and providing for
termination of the contract upon thirty days notice in case of
default. The Circuit Court of Appeals, without referring
to any Colorado decisions or statute upon this question but
basing its conclusions entirely upon decisions of states other
than Colorado, held that under such contract the sellers held
the legal title to the property as trustees for the purchaser to
secure the unpaid purchase price and that (the contract having been recorded) such lien was a prior bona fide recorded
encumbrance under the mechanic's lien law, the Court saying:
"A binding contract for the sale and purchase of land, under which
payments on the purchase price are to be made in the future, vests an equitable
title to the land in the purchaser from the date of the execution of the contract. * * * Under such a contract, the vendor is trustee of the legal title
for the purchaser and the vendee is trustee of the purchase money for the
vendor. * * * The vendor retains the legal title, but only as security for
the purchase price."

THE DEVELOPMENT OF POPULAR
GOVERNMENT
By Judge James H. Teller, of the Denver Bar
HILE it might be supposed that in primitive times
men would be under no delusion as to the divine right
to rule, the contrary seems generally to have been the
fact. The earliest historic and legendary forms of government
were monarchical, or oligarchical. In Persian, Babylonian,
and Egyptian history we find a throne at the farthest limits of
our research; in Greece and the Ionian cities kings ruled in
the heroic days of which Homer sang; and in Italy the story
of monarchy goes back to the time when the mythical and
the historical are inextricably mingled.
How these ideas of government were evolved we cannot
ascertain. We know that they are not all traceable to a common source; that they were developed in different places and
periods, and often without the benefit of the experiences of
the race in other lands. The blond giants of Germany were
slowly working out a system of government, deriving no real
aid, for centuries at least, from Greece and Rome where different systems had grown up through the centuries without help
from the experience of the nations which had arisen, grown
old and perished in the valley of the Nile and on the plains
of Chaldea before Cadmus sowed the dragon's teeth, or
Romulus built his wall upon the banks of the Yellow Tiber.
The tendency toward monarchy in the childhood of the
race seems to have been a survival of a primitive instinct,
manifested in the brute creation in the acceptance of a leader
by the flocks and herds. Democracy, the rule of the many, on
the other hand, is the product of thought. It is based upon
the political equality of men, and the recognition of that
equality must precede the acceptance of the doctrine that the
people are sovereign.
With all writers on the subject the history of popular
government begins in Greece. In insignificant provinces and
towns the Greeks worked out great political problems. "Independent and self-centered, they created in constant struggle
of citizen with citizen and state with state, the groundwork of
those forms of government which have been established in
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the world at large. We see Monarchy, Aristocracy, Democracy rising side by side, and one from the other, the change
being regulated in each community by its past experience and
its special interest in the immediate present. These forms of
government did not appear in their normal simplicity, or in
conformity with a distinct ideal, but under the modifications
necessary to give them vitality."
In Athens, in the year 594 B. C. the first democratic government came into being under the leadership of Solon, a
cultivated and well to do merchant. It was the result of a
peaceable revolution due to bad laws, misgovernment, and
consequent distress and discontent.
The state had been governed first by kings, and then by
an oligarchy consisting of wealthy families which engaged in
frequent quarrels over the control of the state, and gave scant
attention to the interests of the people. At last the condition
of the masses became intolerable. The laws permitted a
creditor to seize the person of his debtor, and the debtor might
and often did sell his minor sons, his unmarried daughters,
and his sisters into slavery. The rapacity of the rich landowners had reduced the cultivating tenants to a state of abject
poverty, while bad laws and a system of oppression had loaded
small properties with debts far beyond their ability to pay.
In this condition the mass of sufferers determined to find some
mode of relief, and were in a state of mutiny against the law.
Out of this situation arose the first government based upon
a recognition of popular rights, though the recognition was but
partial. It was not due to any abstract theory of rights, nor,
so far as can be seen, to a purely humanitarian purpose. It
was the work of necessity, accomplished by a master mind
which grasped the fact that the producers were a vital constituent of the state, and must be granted relief. So when
the governing oligarchy was unable to collect the debts of its
members, or to maintain their rule, they called Solon to the
First Archonship, and entrusted to him, by general consent,
the duty of formulating a new system of law.
The fact that he prohibited the enslaving of citizens of
Attica, cancelled the debts of the very poor, and relieved the
middle class debtors by a change in the monetary system, is
evidence that he possessed the true democratic instinct, and
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placed men above property. This system which was to be continued f9r ten years without the possibility of change, was not,
Solon declared, an ideal system, but was the best which the
people would accept. In later times all reformatory legislation was attributed in a loose way to Solon; hence it is impossible to determine exactly the limits of his work. While this
was the beginning of democratic government, it is too much to
say that it was truly democratic as we now use the term.
Neither the right of suffrage nor the right to hold office was
universal, even among citizens. Landowners were divided
into three classes, according to the income of their lands, each
class having definite privileges and duties. This probably
excluded some of the former governing class, or Eupatridae,
and included some not of that class, and so tended to break
down the old oligarchic institutions. Only those having the
necessary property qualifications could hold office. Property
owners not eligible to hold office were given the elective franchise, together with the right of examining, on the expiration
of each term of office, into the way its duties had been discharged. Thus the community at large was admitted to possess supreme power, and this recognition of the people's
sovereignty has been regarded as Solon's principal achievement.
The sovereignty of the Demos was further recognized in
the establishment of the Council of 400 whose duty it was to
determine the subjects on which the assembly of the people
was to deliberate, and to watch over the execution of their
decrees. The Areopagus, on the other hand, was a body of
aristocratic tendencies, consisting of those who had served in
the office of Archon. Its function was to maintain the laws in
their integrity.
To these two bodies Solon is said to have attributed the
security of the new system.
'Here the people are first recognized as indispensable in
the domestic affairs of the Commonwealth.
While this government was thirty years later overthrown, and displaced for fifty years, it was finally restored
and improved, and continued in force for three centuries.
It is worthy of notice that Democracy prevailed in the
Golden Age of the most brilliant nation of all history; that
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under a free government was produced the greatest constellation of genius which the world has ever seen, the masters of
poetry, sculpture, philosophy and history appearing in a single
era; that a government of the people produced the first real
city of the western world, became the first great maritime
power, successfully repelled the greatest invasion of all time,
and gave to the world those examples of heroism which have
made Marathon and Plataea forever synonyms of heroic devotion and exalted patriotism.
Thus in this small land was demonstrated, once for all,
that for the highest development of art and letters there is
need neither of the patronage of nobility, nor the largess of
kings; and that in a country, poorly endowed by nature, a selfgoverning people may, in all intellectual and material accomplishments, far surpass their neighbors in more favored lands
where the political rights of men are denied.

DICTA DISSERTATIONS
To seek knowledge is better than to have knowledge.-David Starr
Jordan.
If a man empties his purse into his head, no one can take it from him.Franklin.
No one is useless in this world who lightens the burden of it to anyone
else.-Dickens.
The trustworthiness of men trusted seems often to grow with the trust.
-- Woodrow Wilson.
"A certain amount of opposition is a great help to a man; kites rise
against and not with the wind."-Carlyle.
There is nothing noble in being superior to some other man. The true
nobility is in being superior to your previous self.-Hindoo Sayings.
Character is higher than intellect. A great soul will be strong to live,
as well as to think.-Emerson.

RULES OF LEGAL SUCCESS
"To attain eminence as a lawyer it is necessary to:
"1.

Get a thorough education.

"2. Follow this after graduating from college by continued study,
especially in constitutional law.
"3.

Become familiar with the practice and procedure of the courts.

"4. In giving advice to clients a lawyer should always put himself in
the place of his client and then ask, What should I, A. B., do in such a case?
And whatever he sees to be for the interest of himself in such a case, that is
the course he should advise his client to pursue.
"5.

Never make or oppose a motion simply for the purpose of getting

costs.
'6. Cultivate clear enunciation in speaking and the habit of thinking
on the feet. Put a vein of good humor constantly through all arguments, all
examinations and cross-examinations of witnesses and every summing up. The
law is a sedate mistress and loves to be tickled, and whenever a lawyer can get
the old lady to laugh he is sure of having won his case.
"7. The lawyer's meditative moments should be given to the contemplation of the vast interests that are dependent upon the law for their protection, and all the methods by which that protection can be most effectively
rendered.
"8. The lawyer's clientele is the whole country; not merely the particular client in a particular case, or any client in any case or his clients in all
his cases. It is impossible for a lawyer to stand for an interest, affecting almost
everybody in the community at large, and every lawyer ought to argue every
case as if feeling the responsibility of the greater clientage which his arguments
continually affect and make either worse or better.
"9. The lawyer ought to consider his argument in advance, and put
himself in the place of the judge, and honestly say to himself what consideration ought to operate in my mind if I were judge, for deciding this case in my
favor. And then he should chiefly enforce before the judge those very considerations. So the lawyer has to put himself in the case of the other man
twice over-once in the place of his client and once in the place of the judge;
and by this expansion of his habit of thought he will grow to such a condition
that he will almost invariably bring the judge and his client to stand upon
the same platform of principles, thus securing a favorable decision for his
client and the confidence of the judge.
"10. A lawyer who will practice upon these principles may occasionally lose a case, but will never lose a client; and the number of his clients will
constantly increase and the importance of the interests intrusted to him will
constantly grow."

... Dictaphun .

+

SECOND BIG MONTH I
Dictaphun, undisuaded by the shouts of plagiarism on the part of those
who imagined, wrote, stole or acted the parts of the heros in the revival of
aged Colorado Bar humor, moves on to greater heights. Ad aspera, ad
astera, or something. We're off-

No. 9
BREAKING THE SAD NEWS BY TELEGRAPH
Justice of the Peace D. P. Wilson, of Canon City, was always a beloved
and rather irresponsible member of Colorado's pioneer bar. During the early
sixties he and Moses Hallett (Judge Hallett to you) kept bachelor hall in
Pueblo. As a matter of fact Hallett, Henry Dubbs and Charles S. Thomas
made it a pleasant duty in later years to see that Wilson did not want. One
day Wilson persuaded Senator Jerome B. Chaffee to lend him $100, saying
he would repay the debt by July 1, next, and would do so, if alive. On July
1, Senator Chaffee received a telegram signed D. P. Wilson: "Died last
night."

No. 10
AVOID THE PITFALL THESE DID NOT ESCAPE
In early times at Alamosa the late Judge Charles Holbrook and the late
Sam Browne formed a partnership for the practice of law. It was of short
duration and a friend inquired of Holbrook the cause of the early dissolution
of the firm.
"Well," said Holbrook, "we dissolved because of mutual mistake. You
see, Sam thought I had some business and I thought Sam was a lawyer."

No. 11-NOT GOOD, BUT 'T WILL DO, 'T WILL DO
The scene is laid in the District Court room of the late Chief Justice
George W. Allen (its pretty hard for a Supreme Court justice not to be chief
justice we hear) then District Judge. One Mary Jones complained of the
Colorado and Southern Railroad Co. Appearances: For Jones, John G.
Taylor, Esq., illuminated by a flower in his button hole and otherwise. For
the guilty corporation, E. E. Whitted, Esq., without ornamentation. Jones,
incidentally, was a beautiful woman.
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Judge Allen: *'Mr.Taylor, I understand this matter has been compromised."
Mr. Taylor: "Compromised, your honor? Counsel for the railroad has
been making love, but has not yet proposed."

No. 12-WORSE,
BUT STILL 'T WILL DO, STILL 'T WILL DO
Aultman, situate on Bull Hill above Cripple Creek, was alleged to be
the highest incorporated town in the world. It is more than two miles above
the sea. Tom Bagley, Esq., was justice of the peace and proprietor of the
Red Onion saloon, graciously and impartially dispensing justice and liquor
from the same bar. One night he fined two offenders $10 each. One of
them said: "I will take this case up." "You can't do that," cracked Justice
Bagley, "This is the highest court in the world."

13-THIS NUMBER
DESERVES THIS WORST OF BAD PUNS
After the arraignment of a defendant accused of crime his attorney made
the usual application before Judge Hallett that his client be admitted to bail.
The attorney was considered to be a rather slippery ornament of the bar, and,
while of course the court was agreeable to admitting the accused to bail, insisted on examining the sureties before approving the bond. "Let the bondsmen stand up," said Judge Hallett. Two unkempt, greasy and obviously disreputable men arose in the rear of the court. Turning to the lawyer Judge
Hallett thundered: "The court said bonds, sir; not vagabonds !"

No. 14-IF THEY DON'T HURRY, THE JURYMEN
WILL SIT ON THE FLOOR IN THE NEW
COURT HOUSE
While Moses Hallett (Judge Hallett to you) was riding circuit in the
territorial days he noticed that the same faces frequently appeared in the jury
boxes of widely separated localities where trials were had. He asked the sheriff
why he so often selected the same men to form the jury panel. "Well," said the
sheriff, "the jury benches are so rough and full of splinters I have to thoose
only men who wear leather seats in their trousers." (We bet the sheriff said
trousers!) "Thereby," commented his honor (Judge Hallett to you), "introducing a qualification for jury service unknown either to the statute or the
common law."
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No. 15-THIS, ON THE CONTRARY, IS GOOD
Trial before the Hallett aforesaid; among those present, Earl M. Cranston, Esq., District Attorney.
The Court: "Proceed with the examination of the jurors, Mr. District
Attorney."
Mr. Cranston: "What is your name, your age and business?"
Juror (holding hand back of his ear) : "What's that?"
Mr. Cranston: "What is your name, age and business?"
Juror: "I can't hear half you say."
Mr. Cranston: "May it please the court, I challenge the juror for
cause."
The Court: "What's that ?"
Mr. Cranston: "I challenge the juror for cause."
The Court: "What cause?"
Mr. Cranston: "He say's he can't hear half that I say."
The Court: "That's enough. Denied."

No. 16-THIS MAY BE THE LAST OF THE SERIES
Moses Hallett (Judge Hallett to you) on his ascension to the bench at
once began the strict enforcement of court room proprieties, many, if not most
of which, are yet the vogue, at least in the Denver courts. Otto Mears,
prominent and influential, was displeased with Hallett's alteration of the free
and easy manners of the people's courts, and, as he had been instrumental in
procuring the judge's appointment, conceived the rash thought of bearding
the lion in his den. He entered the court room without taking off his hat
and smoking a cigar. After the brief and glaring pause with which he usually
prefaced a reprimand, Judge Hallett said in a voice running the gamut from
piano to fortissimo: "Mr. Bailiff, remove that hat; that cigar; and that
man."

THERE OUGHTA BE A LAW
The city council endeavors to make the depression deeper, as reported
by your Denver Post:
"In an effort to cut down the increasing number of personal damage
claims brought against the city, the city council will consider . . . an ordi-

nance absolving the city of all liability in cases of injury suffered through a
defect in any sidewalk . . . unless notice of such dangerous condition shall

have been filed with the mayor five days before such accident or injury occurs."
There seems, to the Editors, to be a lingering likeness between that
proposal and the leaving of a note inside the house to advise the door key is
under the mat.

(Eorroa's Norm-It is intended to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of a filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification
of opinion, such will be indicated in later digests.)
BONDS-INTEREST ON BONDS AFTER MATURITY-MANDAMUS

STATUTE

CONSTRUED--North Denver Municipal Irrigation District vs. HeathNo. 12940-Decided June 20, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
1. In an action in Mandamus under the code to compel the board of
County Commissioners to make the required levy of assessments sufficient to
pay bonds and interest thereon after maturity, held that the controlling question is as to the right of the bondholder to interest on bonds of an irrigation
district and interest on the attached coupons after maturity; that our special
statute merely entitles the holder to the principal and interest on the bonds
to the time of their maturity.-Judgment reversed with instructions to dismiss and to tax the costs both on review and below to the plaintiff.

CASUALTY INSURANCE-SCOPE OF POLICY-PERSONS IN INTEREST IN
COVENANT TO DEFEND INSURED AGAINST SUITS FOR DAMAGES-The

Continental Casualty Co. vs. Carver-No. 12747-Decided June 20, 1932
-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.

1. Where a casualty insurance policy, insuring an auto sales company
"against loss imposed upon the assured by law for damages on account of
bodily injuries accidentally suffered by . . . persons not employed by assured",
specifically provided that it did not cover persons other than officers and employees of the company, the insurance company was not liable for damages
from injuries occurring while a car of the insured, used for demonstration
purposes, was being driven by a friend of the insured, in an endeavor to make
a sale for the insured.
2. A provision in such a policy that the casualty company will defend
the assured against any suits brought against it to recover damages is not a
contract for the benefit of the plaintiffs in such suits, and, where the casualty
company fails to defend in such a suit against the assured, it is not liable to
the plaintiff on a judgment obtained therein, and nothing therein decided is
res adjudicata as to the casualty company.-Judgment reversed.

TRIAL-MISCONDUCT OF COUNSEL-RIGHTS OF INSURANCE COMPANYREVERSIBLE ERRoR-National Surety Company vs. L. .4. Morlan-No.

12702-DecidedJune 27, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Moore.
1. In an action against an insurance company on a burglary policy, it

is reversible error where the attorney of the party successful in the court
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below had, in closing, indulged in an inflammatory appeal to the prejudices
of the jury, based on matters not justified by the pleadings or the evidence.
2. An insurance company is entitled to the same fair trial as an individual.-Judgment reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.

SALE OF TAX CERTIFICATES BY COUNTY TREASURER-VALIDITY OF RESOLUTIONS OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS--PRIMA FACIA CAsE-Thompson

et al vs. County Commissioners et al-Decided June 27, 1932-Opinion
by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. Sec. 7409 C.L. 1921 provides for striking off to tie County, at
face, real estate offered for sale for taxes with no bids, and the issuance of
certificates to the county. Chap. 152 page 612 L 1927, authorizes treasurer
to sell such certificates to any person who desires to purchase them, on payment of "such sum as board of county commissioners * * * at any regular
or special meeting may decide and authorize by order duly entered in the
recorded proceedings of such board".
2. The power of county commissioners is limited by the statute to
fixing of prices at which each certificate shall be sold, and that it neither
extends to a bulk sale for a lump sum nor to a particular person.
3. When the basis of the complaint is the charge of a bulk sale for a
lump sum to a particular purchaser, and the evidence substantiates the complaint, the plaintiff has established a prima facia case and it was error to sustain a motion to dismiss.-Judgment reversed and remanded.

BAILMENTS-CHATTEL MORTGAGE BY BAILEE-The First State Bank of

Wiggins vs. Simmons-No. 12681-Decided June 27, 1932-Opinion by
Mr. Justice Campbell.
1 .A contract whereby seeds were delivered by a seed company to a
grower for the sole purpose of raising a seed crop for the company, the grower's only contract right being to receive a sum of money for his services in
growing the crop, is a contract of bailment.
2. A chattel mortgage on the bailed property, given by the bailee,
creates no right in the mortgagee as against the bailor or as against a judgment creditor of the bailee.-Judgment affirmed.

ZONING ORDINANCES

-

CONSTITUTIONALITY -

MANDAMUS -APPELLATE

PROCEDURE-Hedgcock vs. People of the State of Colorado on relation of
Samuel Reed-No. 12630-Decided June 27, 1932-Opinion by Mr.
Justice Hilliard.
1. Where the Denver building inspector refused to issue a permit to
construct a store building at the south-west corner of Colfax Avenue and
Adams Street for the sole reason that the said structure was not to be built
fifteen feet back from the sidewalk line as provided in the zoning ordinance,
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and it appeared that for many years the vicinity had been a business district
and that for many blocks along Colfax Avenue the ordinance had not been
observed, the refusal of the building inspector to issue the permit was so
arbitrary and unreasonable as to make the ordinance unconstitutional in its
operation and effect.
2. The validity of a zoning ordinance circumscribing the owner in
the use of his property must be determined by considering it in connection
with the circumstances and the locality.
3. A municipal charter allowing an appeal from the building inspector to a so-called board of adjustment cannot supersede provisions of the
Civil Code nor control jurisdiction of the courts.
4. Such a board of adjustment has no authority to review the legal or
equitable character of the building inspector's act in allowing or rejecting an
application for a building permit, nor to pass upon the question as to whether
the provisions of the zoning ordinance are in furtherance of the proper exercise of the police power of the municipality.

RECEIVERSHIP IN FORECLOSURE-BUSINESS
PROPERTY-COST OF CONTINUING BUSINESS--LIABILITY OF MORTGAGEE FOR SAME-WAIVER OF

EVIDENCE OF SAME - ADMISSIBILITY - West Colfax Loan
Corporation vs. Culp---No. 13,100-Decided July 5, 1932-Opnion by
Mr. Justice Butler.
1. A mortgagee who obtains appointment of a receiver of property
used as a sanatarium, and later dismisses the foreclosure proceedings with
prejudice, is liable for costs of operating the sanatarium during receivership,
including salaries, if the profits of the receivership were insufficient to pay
the same.
2. Evidence tending to show that certain employees of the sanatarium,
shortly after appointmaent of the receiver, agreed to look, for compensation,
only to the profits of the business, or that they otherwise waived the right to
collect compensation from the mortgagee, should be admitted.
CLAIMS -

Prouty Bros. Engineering Co.
ENGINEERS, APPRAISERS

EXPERT COURT TESTIMONY
SURVEYS
- COURT PLATS
10TH FLOOR EXCHANGE BLDG.

KEYSTONE 2635

H. N. WOODMAN
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER
Depositions, References and General Shorthand Reporting
313 MmL."m SAvINGs BumIoDNG

Tabor 5953
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ROGERS

A SERVICE ..... of noteworthy character combined
with moderate cost. Last year 53% of our adcult services
were conducted at an average charge of less than $245.
And everything is so complete that extra charges are unknown.

ROGERS MORTUARY
Phone TAbor 5351

D ENVER

1544 Lincoln Stret

WILLARD J. Guy COMPANY
408 DENVER NATIONAL BUILDING
TAbor 2348
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ENGRAVED STATIONERY
a requisite for the successful professional man
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... A JURY
drawn from more than
10,000 Denver homes
has returned a verdict
in favor of..........

GAS HEAT
and has banished to
exile all dirt, drudgery
and worry formerly associated with.......

HOME HEATING
Public Service Company oF Colorado

I
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TRUST BANKING
for
CORPORATIONS and INDIVIDUALS

Services to Corporations
Trustee under Corporate Mortgages . . . Depositary for Protective Committees... Transfer Agent
and Registrar for Corporate Stocks... Miscellaneous Fiscal Agencies.

Services to Individuals and Families
Executor and Administrator of Estates... Trustee under Wills... Trustee of Living Trusts and
Life Insurance Trusts . . Safe-keeping of Securities.
0

Escrowvs
BUSINESS SERVICE FOR BUSINESS MEN
AND WOMEN AND THEIR COUNSEL

THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL BANK
THE AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK
THE DENVER NATIONAL BANK
THE COLORADO NATIONAL BANK
THE INTERNATIONAL TRUST COMPANY

I.

